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The Landlord's Tort Liability For Injuries Caused
By Defects Upon The Demised Premises

I. INTRODUCTION
For some period of time prior to September 27, 1972, Roger Green
decided that he was tired of living in a pigsty. Inasmuch as Mr.
Green's landlord by his inaction indicated an unwillingness to transform the living quarters back into the residential dwelling unit it
had been represented to be, Mr. Green indicated his dissatisfaction
with the premises by refusing to pay rent.
On September 27, 1972, the landlord commenced an unlawful
detainer action against the tenant for possession of the premises
and for back rent. Mr. Green defended on the grounds that the
landlord had failed to maintain the leased premises in a habitable
condition. The defense was rejected, and Green appealed to the
San Francisco Superior Court where a trial de novo was held. In
this trial, Green introduced evidence that the building in which he
lived suffered from some eighty housing code violations and that
a condemnation hearing had been scheduled. He also introduced
evidence that his apartment had a collapsed bathroom ceiling, was
infested with vermin, lacked heat, had blocked plumbing, had
exposed and faulty wiring, and had an illegally installed and dangerous stove. The Superior Court was not impressed, holding that
the repair and deduct provisions of Civil Code Section 1941, et. seq.1
were his only remedies. Judgment was entered for the landlord.
The California Supreme Court, however, was impressed with
Roger Green's defense, and reversed the lower Court's ruling in
2
Green v. Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco.
While the primary issue in this case involved the question as to
whether the uninhabitable condition of a premises could be raised
as a defense in an unlawful detainer action, the Court's discussion
included extensive reference to modern products liability law. The
significance of the language is that it indicates that the Court at
this time may be willing to completely overhaul the traditional

§§ 1941, et seq. (West 1954).
2. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
1. CAL. Civ. CODE
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common law which to a great extent still governs landlord and
tenant relations, especially with respect to a landlord's liability for
injuries caused by defects on the demised premises.
The purpose of this comment is to examine the liability of the
landlord for injuries sustained as a result of a dangerous defective
condition on the demised premises, the emphasis being on California
law. Initially, the focus will be on the general rule regarding such
liability and its exceptions. The focus will then turn to recent
developments regarding the interpretation of residential lease
agreements by the courts and the relation of this interpretation
to the rules which govern consumer law. The comment will conclude with what the writer considers to be a more viable alternative
with respect to the liability for injuries in the landlord and tenant
relationship.
II. THE CoMMoN LAW
A. History And The TraditionalView
"At common law, the real estate lease developed in the field of
real property law. Under property law concepts, a lease was considered a conveyance or sale of the premises for a term of years,
subject to the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor. ' '3 These precepts
arose during the agrarianism of the early middle ages, 4 and in the
agrarian society, the tenant was primarily interested in the land
for farming.5 ".

. [W] hatever simple living structures may have

been included in the leasehold were of secondary importance and
were readily repairable by the typical 'jack-of-all-trades' lessee
farmer." In fact, since the land was more important, the tenant
was still required to pay rent even if any building on the land was
7
destroyed.
Caveat emptor created a presumption that the tenant had
conducted a reasonable inspection of the premises before taking
3. Id. at 622, 517 P.2d at 1171, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
4. Id. at 622, 517 P.2d at 1172, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
5. Comment: Landlord & Tenant: Repairing the Duty to Repair, 11
SANTA CLARA LAWYER 298, 299 (1971).

6. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 622, 517 P.2d 1168, 1172, 111
Cal. Rptr. 704, 708 (1974).
7. Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077-78 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).

possession, and the tenant was required to return the property to
the landlord in substantially the same condition as he had leased
it.3 Indeed, the tenant for years was required to keep the property
in repair. While it was not well settled, there was authority
stating that tenants for years were liable for permissive waste.9
Because the land was more important than any structures
included in the leasehold, and because the tenant was capable of
making needed repairs, the common law rule absolved the landlord
of all obligation to repair. 10 As a general proposition, the rule
also incidentially absolved the landlord of any liabflity for injuries
caused by defects upon the demised premises:
When land is leased to a tenant, the law of property regards the
lease as equivalent to a sale of the land for the term of the lease.
The lessee acquires an estate in the land, and becomes for the time
being the owner and occupier, subject to all the liabilities of one
in possession, both to those who enter the land and to those outside of it. Therefore, as in the case of the vendor [of land] ....
it is the general rule that the lessor is not liable to the lessee, or
to others on the land, for injuries occuring after the lessee has taken
possession, even though such injuries result from a dangerous condition existing at the time of the transfer."
As it stands today, the general rule is that absent a covenant
in the lease, concealment, fraud, or misrepresentation, a lessor is
not liable to a tenant, or to the tenant's invitees or employees, for
injuries caused by a defective condition or a faulty construction
of the premises existing at the time of the letting or arising thereafter.1 2 The landlord's liability to the tenant's invitees, including
the tenant's family, is no greater than to the tenant himself. 13
Conveyances of interests in land to the individual remain one of
the only areas of the law today where the consumer pretty much
takes at his own risk. The rules which apply to one who leases
real property are basically the same as the rules which until fairly
recently governed vendors and vendees in the sale of land with
respect to liability for injuries caused by a defective condition.

Some of the rules governing the vendor-vendee relationship have
undergone some change in the past few years, and this will be

discussed infra.
8. Comment:

Landlord & Tenant: Repairing the Duty to Repair, 11

SANTA CLARA LAWYER

298, 298-99 (1971).

9. 3 HOLDSwoRTH, HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW at 122-23 (1923).

10. Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
11. RESTATmIENT (SEcoND) or TORTS § 356, comment a (1965).
12. Hogan v. Miller, 153 Cal. App. 2d 107, 114, 314 P.2d 230, 235 (1957);
30 CAL. JUR. 2d, Landlord & Tenant, § 146 (1956).
13. Hanson v. Luft, 58 Cal. 2d 443, 445, 374 P.2d 641, 642, 24 Cal. Rptr.

681, 682 (1962).
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The general rule was that a vendor of real estate is generally
not liable to the vendee or others for personal injuries suffered as
a result of a defective condition of the land at the time of
transfer. 14 This was perhaps due to the importance of the deed
of conveyance, which was taken to represent the full agreement
of the parties, and to exclude all other terms and conditions. 15
As the doctrine of caveat emptor applied to the sale of land, 16
17
so it also applied to the conveyance of a leasehold.
There are a few limited exceptions to the landlord's non-liability
for injuries caused by defects on the premises. It would be
appropriate to discuss them at this point.
B.

Latent Defects

The landlord is liable to the tenant and his invitees for injuries
caused by hidden defects existing at the time of the making of the
lease, if the defects were not apparent to the tenant, and if the
landlord had actual knowledge of the defects, or the defects had
existed for such an unreasonable length of time that the landlord
can be charged with constructive knowledge of their existence.' 8
Further, if the landlord creates a condition on the premises which
is less safe than before and where the hazards are not open and
obvious in all particulars, a duty is owed to the tenants or invitees
who were familiar with the former condition to apprise them of
the increased risk.' 9
14. Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 1027, 1031 (1973).
15. Id.; See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS §

352, comment a

(1965).

16. Supra note 14.
17. Daulton v. Williams, 81 Cal. App. 2d 70, 75, 183 P.2d 325, 328 (1947);
see generally 30 CAL. JUR.2d, Landlord & Tenant § 150 (1956).
18. Hanson v. Luft, 58 Cal. 2d 443, 445, 374 P.2d 641, 642, 24 Cal. Rptr.

681, 682 (1962); Powell v. Stivers, 108 Cal. App. 2d 72, 73, 238 P.2d 34, 35
(1951); Daulton v. Williams, 81 Cal. App. 2d 70, 75, 183 P.2d 325, 328
(1947); see generally 30 CAL. JUR. 2d, Landlord & Tenant § 147 (1956).
The Restatement view is that the lessor is liable for concealment or nondisclosure of a dangerous condition if the lessee does not know or have
reason to know of the condition, if the lessor knows or should know and
realizes or should realize the risk involved, and if the lessor has reason to
expect that the lessee will not discover the condition or realize the risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 358 (1965).

19. Foster v. A.P. Jacobs & Associates, 85 Cal. App. 2d 746, 750, 193
P.2d 971, 974 (1948).

With regard to the sale of land, the rule is similar:
(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition, whether natural or artificial, which involves
unreasonable risk to persons on the land, is subject to liability to
the vendee and others upon the land with the consent of the vendee
or his subvendee for physical harm caused by the condition after
the vendee has taken possession, if
(a) the vendee does not know or have reason to know of the
condition or the risk involved, and
(b) the vendor knows or has reason to know of the condition,
and realizes or should realize the risk involved, and has reason to
believe that
the vendee will not discover the condition or realize
20
the risk.
The application of these rules to the landlord and tenant relationship would almost seem to imply that a leasehold carries with it
an implied warranty of fitness for its intended purpose. While this
may be true to a certain extent (as indicated by the warranty of
habitability, discussed infra, or where the parties contemplate that
premises which are not yet in existence will be put to a certain
use 21), the landlord's duties in this respect are quite limited. For
instance, the landlord is responsible for injuries caused by a concealed condition only if the dangerous condition would not be discoverable by a reasonable inspection by the tenant. If the defect
or danger would be apparent to the tenant on a reasonably careful inspection, there is no duty upon the landlord to notify the
tenant of the condition. 22 The tenant must himself use reasonable care and diligence to inspect the premises in which he is to
28
reside.
The landlord under these rules can safely take the -attitude that
if the defect can be discovered on reasonable inspection, he need
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353 (1965); Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d
1027, 1036, n. 10 (1973).
21. See Woolford v. Electric Appliance, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 2d 385, 75
P.2d 112 (1938).
22. Powell v. Stivers, 108 Cal. App. 2d 72, 73-74, 238 P.2d 34, 35 (1951).
The Court goes on to say that the tenant assumes the risk of all defects
obvious to ordinary observation. Id. at 74, 238 P.2d at 35. There is an
implication here that the Court might be willing to equate that which may
become apparent on reasonable inspection to that which is obvious to
ordinary observation. The Court fails to consider that possibly the landlord has no busines leasing an apartment in the first place if it contains an
obvious dangerous defect.
Further, the landlord's attitude under this interpretation may well be
that he will not disclose a defect which could be uncovered on reasonable
inspection, because disclosure would significantly diminish the possibility
of a lease agreement with the prospective tenant.
See also 30 CAL. JUR. 2d, Landlord & Tenant § 150 (1956).
23. Daulton v. Williams, 81 Cal. App. 2d 70, 75, 183 P.2d 325, 328 (1947).
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not mention it, much less do anything about it. So when a five
year old child's pajamas caught fire when he came too close to a
gas heater which had no cover, the Court stated,
... [W]hile the landlord is under a duty to warn the tenant
of any hidden danger or defect in the leased premises of which he
has knowledge [citations omitted] there is no duty to warn the
tenant of obvious and patent defects and dangers [citations
omitted] .24
If the defect is known to the tenant and the tenant fails to protect
his invitee, the tenant may be liable, but the landlord is not, for
if the landlord was required to warn everyone the tenant allowed
on the premises of a dangerous condition, the landlord would have
25
the duties of an occupant while divested of the benefits.
Of course, in this case it is conceivable that a warning to be wary
of a dangerous defective condition might have been lost on the five
year old child. While it is possible to impute knowledge of the
defect to the parents, why further impute this knowledge to an
innocent child as a basis for denying recovery, when it would have
been a simple matter for the landlord to remedy the 'defect before
the tenancy began?
However, as the Court notes, the landlord cannot be overly
burdened. After all, he receives none of the benefits of the
occupant-he only collects the rent.
The idea that the landlord is responsible for injuries caused by
hidden defects of which he has knowledge evaporates further when
it is realized that the landlord has no duty to inspect his tenement
with the object of locating latent defects or of repairing them, for
the doctrine of caveat emptor applies. 26 In applying the two rules,
that the landlord has no duty to warn his tenant of defects which
could be discovered by the tenant on a reasonably careful inspection, and that the landlord has no duty to inspect for latent defects,
it can readily be seen that the concealment exception to the general
rule of the landlord's non-liability is largely fictional. It would
only seem to apply in a case where the landlord gained knowledge
24. Hanson v. Luft, 58 Cal. 2d 443, 445, 375 P.2d 641, 642, 24 Cal. Rptr.
681, 682 (1962).

25. Id. The Court affirmed a judgment for the defendant landlord.
26. Daulton v. Williams, 81 Cal. App. 2d 70, 75, 183 P.2d 325, 328 (1947);
see generally 30 CAL. JUR. 2d, Landlord & Tenant § 148 (1956).

of a hidden defect because of a prior tenant, who may have been
unfortunate enough to discover a defect such as an unsupported
floor by falling through it.
Further, the extent of the landlord's duty, when it does exist,
is to warn; he is under no obligation to remedy the defect. The
landlord discharges his full liability regarding hidden defects
known to him if he informs the tenant of those defects. The duty
21
to warn others in turn falls upon the tenant.
In reality, for the most part the tenant assumes all the risks of
injury arising from a defective condition in the premises. As will
be pointed out infra, this result is not only unfair but is now also
unrealistic.
C. Covenant To Repair
"At common law, there was no duty resting upon the lessor of
real property ... to put or keep the property in any particular
condition or fit -for any particular purpose." 28 Further, ". . . it

[was] not in the power of a tenant to make repairs at the expense
of the landlord, unless there is a special agreement between them
authorizing him to do this. The tenant takes the premises for better
or for worse, and cannot involve the landlord in expense for
repairs without his consent.

' 29

One type of agreement addressing itself to the problem of who
will pay for and make repairs to the leased premises is the landlord's covenant to repair, wherein the landlord agrees to repair
delapidations occurring on the premises. Under some circumstances, such a covenant effectively fixes responsibility for injuries
caused by 'a defective condition of the premises on the landlord.
Where such a covenant is in effect, the covenant is construed to
mean that repairs will be made within a reasonable time after
notice from the tenant.8 0 Keeping this in mind, the rule is that
the landlord is subject to liability for harm caused to the tenant
by a condition of disrepair existing before or arising after the tenant
has taken possession if the landlord has agreed to keep the land
in repair, and the disrepair creates an unreasonable risk of harm
to persons on the land which the performance of the landlord's
agreement would have prevented.8 1 The fact that the tenant has
27. Shotwell v. Bloom, 60 Cal. App. 2d 303, 311, 140 P.2d 728, 733 (1943).
28. Sieber v. Blanc, 76 Cal. 173, 174, 18 P. 260, 261 (1881).

29. Van Everly v. Ogg, 59 Cal. 563, 565 (1881).

30. Sieber v. Blanc, 76 Cal. 173, 174, 18 P. 260, 261.
31. Singer v. Eastern Columbia, Inc., 72 Cal. App. 2d 402, 411, 164 P.2d
531, 535 (1945). The Court adopts this passage from RSTATEMENT OF
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knowledge of a dangerous condition does not relieve the landlord
of liability where the landlord has agreed to repair, for when the
duty rests on the landlord "... the tenant will naturally depend
upon him to make the repairs and allow conditions to exist which
32
he would otherwise cause to be corrected."
The landlord's duty in this respect is not contractual, but rather
is a tort duty based upon the fact that the contract gives the landlord the ability to make the repairs, and it gives him control over
them.3 3 The warranty of fitness which proved to be illusory in
the concealment exception is present here, and the landlord is
required to compensate those injuries resulting from unfitness of
the premises.
A distinction should be made between a covenant to repair in
the lease and a promise to repair by the landlord after being notified of a state of disrepair absent a covenant to repair on his part
in the lease. In the latter situation, mere failure to make repairs
after notice or a promise to -do so imposes no tort liability on the
34
landlord.
In the absence of a covenant to repair, the landlord's failure to
make promised repairs is nonfeasance, and does not give rise to a
right of action for damage caused by a state of disrepair. However,
even absent such a covenant to repair, where the landlord undertakes to make repairs on the demised premises, he is liable for injuries caused by the negligence of himself or his servants in making
such repairs, the liability extending to all persons who, within the
contemplation of the parties, were to use the premises under the
TORTS
(1956).

§ 357 (1939).

See also 30 CAL. JuR. 2d, Landlord & Tenant § 151

32. Singer v. Eastern Columbia, Inc., 72 Cal. Ap. 2d 402, 411, 164 P.2d
531, 536 (1945); Mariotti v. Berns, 114 Cal. App. 2d 666, 670, 251 P.2d 72, 74
(1952).

33. Singer v. Eastern Columbia, Inc., 72 Cal. App. 2d 402, 411, 164 P.2d
531, 535-36 (1945). At least until recently, the landlord's breach of his
covenant still did not justify the tenant's refusal to pay rent. "A covenant
to repair on the part of the lessor and a covenant to pay rent on the part of

the lessee are usually considered as independent covenants, and unless the
covenant to repair is expressly or impliedly made a condition precedent to
the covenent to pay rent, the breach of the former does not justify the
refusal on the part of the lessee to perform the latter." Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143, 145, 146 P. 423, 424 (1915).
34. Dorswitt v. Wilson, 51 Cal. App. 2d 623, 625, 125 P.2d 626, 627

(1942).

hiring. 85 The landlord is duty bound to use ordinary care when he
undertakes to make repairs to the demised premises, and his failure
to use such care is misfeasance which renders him legally liable
for injuries caused thereby. 36
The distinction made between nonfeasance and misfeasance in this
regard is unfortunate. While it is true that the tenant is lured
into a sense of security because of his feeling that a 'defect has been
repaired when the landlord has undertaken to make such a repair,
the rule seems unnecessarily harsh on those landlords who, because
of humanitarian motives or simple generosity, undertake to make
their tenant's living quarters slightly more livable. It is not suggested that these landlords should be immunized from liability for
negligence in making repairs, but rather that those landlords who
do nothing at all (or worse, promise to undertake a repair, and
yet do nothing) should be subject to the same liability. Surely
in the latter instances the tenant is lulled into a false sense of
security, but the landlord is not liable if the tenant should find
out, by way of an unfortunate accident, that the promised repair
has not been made.
The rule 'as it presently exists would tend to discourage a landlord
from making repairs when he was not obligated by law or agreement to do so. This is unfair, not only to the landlord who would
ordinarily undertake to make repairs, but also to the tenant, who
in the great majority of cases would benefit from the undertaking.
D. Common Areas
Another exception to the general rule of non-liability of the
landlord relates to "common areas":
One who leases a part of the premises, retaining control of other
portions such as common walks and passages which the tenant is
entitled to use, is subject to liability to persons lawfully on the land
with the consent of the tenant for damages caused by a dangerous
condition existing on the part under the owner's control, if by reasonable
care he could have discovered this condition and made it
safe.8 7
35. Donahoo v. Kress House Moving Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 237, 242, 153 P.2d
349, 352 (1945); see also 30 CAL. JuR. 2d, Landlord & Tenant § 154 (1956).

36. See Minoletti v. Sabini, 27 Cal. App. 3d 321, 324, 103 Cal. Rptr. 528,
529 (1972); cite omitted, Black v. Partridge, 115 Cal. App. 2d 639, 645, 252
P.2d 760, 763 (1953); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1973).
37. Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties, Inc., 28 Cal. 2d 394, 399, 170
P.2d 5, 7-8 (1946); Mariotti v. Berns, 114 Cal. App. 2d 666, 672, 251 P.2d 72,
75-76 (1952). The rule applies to a portion of the premises reserved by the
landlord for use in common by himself and his tenants, or by different
tenants. Harris v. Joffe, 28 Cal. 2d 418, 423, 170 P.2d 454, 458 (1946); accord
Mariotti v. Berns, supra at 673, 251 P.2d at 76. 30 CAL. JUTR. 2d, Landlord &
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The care required of the landlord in this regard is that he make
reasonably careful inspections of such areas at reasonable intervals
to learn of dangers not apparent to the eye.38 The landlord is not
liable unless he had actual knowledge of a condition, or it has
existed for such a period of time to justify the conclusion that in
the exercise of ordinary care he should have known of its existence
within such time as would have given him a reasonable opportunity
to make repairs.8 9
Aside from the actual or constructive knowledge prerequisite for
liability, there appears to be a further limitation. In Watwood v.
Fosdick4 0 the plaintiff fell down a flight of stairs within a tenement primarily because there were no handrails on which she could
retain her balance. After this tenement had been built, an
ordinance was enacted which required handrails on such stairways.
Although alterations had been made to the apartment house after
the enactment of the ordinance, handrails were still not provided.
The California Supreme Court held that the ordinance applied
only to tenements constructed after its enactment, and that the
alterations were not sufficient to bring this tenement within the
terms of the statute. It was further held that while the landlord
has a duty to keep parts of the building used in common by the
tenants in repair, he is under no duty to remove structural defects
which are visible and known to the tenants, as the tenants take
the premises as they are at the commencement of the tenancy. 41
It is difficult to understand the rationale behind this decision,
especially in light of the fact that the ordinance should have been
sufficient to give the landlord constructive notice of a defect on
Tenant, § 152 (1956) states that the rule applies to areas which the tenant
has the privilege of using, or areas which are to be used in common and

are necessary to the safe use of the part leased. See also Donahoo v. Kress
House Moving Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 237, 244, 153 P.2d 349, 353 (1945); Freeman
v. Mozzera, 150 Cal. App. 2d 61, 63, 309 P.2d 510, 511 (1957); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTs §§ 360 and 361, (1965).
38. Di Mare v. Cresci, 58 Cal. 2d 292, 298, 373 P.2d 860, 863, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 772, 775 (1962); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1973).

39. Busby v. Silverman, 82 Cal. App. 2d 393, 396, 186 P.2d 442, 445
(1947).
40. 212 Cal. 84, 297 P. 881 (1931).

41. Id. at 85, 297 P. at 881. A judgment for the Plaintiff was reserved.

For further cases exempting the landlord from liability for dangerous conditions in common areas see Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 387, 397-400 (1973).

his premises. While it is one thing to say that a tenant assumes
a risk of harm when he encounters an avoidable defect (such as
where a tenant attempts to jump over an excavation instead of
passing around it), it is quite another to say that the tenant voluntarily assumes the risk of encountering an unavoidable defect (such
as here, where the stairway is the tenant's only means of access
to her apartment); this is especially true when the landlord had
at least constructive notice that an ordinance set a standard of
safety for stairways (they must have handrails), and especially
when the landlord, with such knowledge that a dangerous defective
condition existed within his tenement, made alterations to his
tenement, yet made not the slightest attemp to remedy the defect.
In passing, it might be noted that there is an exception to the
landlord's non-liability which is related to the common areas exception. The lessor is liable for injuries resulting from a dangerous
condition on land leased for a purpose involving public admission
if the lessor
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover
that the condition involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such
persons, and
(b) has reason to expect that the lessee will admit them before
the land is put in safe condition for their reception, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to discover or remedy the
condition, or otherwise to protect such persons against it.42
E. Nuisance

A further exception to the general rule of the landlord's nonliability relates to injuries to third parties resulting from activities
upon the premises which constitute a nuisance. The rule is that
while ordinarily a landlord is not liable for injuries to others arising from a tenant's activities, there is an exception in the case of
conditions upon the property which constitute a nuisance, which
conditions, although not originally created by the owner, existed
48
at the time the premises were demised.
This rule will generally apply where the tenant has created a
nuisance during the duration of a first tenancy, 'and the landlord
re-leases the premises to the tenant or to another with the condi42.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 359 (1965).

43. Dennis v. City of Orange, 110 Cal. App. 16, 22, 293 P. 865, 867 (1930).
With regard to the sale of land, some cases have held the vendor liable
where the vendee knew of a condition existing at the time of the conveyance but had insufficient time to remedy it, and where the defect caused
an unreasonable risk of harm to outsiders. See Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 1027,

1038-40 (1973).

This rationale is probably equally applicable to landlords.
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tion unremedied and existing as created during the first tenancy.
Conceivably, the rule would also apply where the landlord has some
degree of control over his tenants' conduct on the leased premises,
yet fails to take action when the tenant creates 'a condition which
constitutes a nuisance.
HI. CONSUMER LAW

Modem consumer law relating to liability for injuries caused by
defective products might well be said to have its origin in
MacPherson v. Buick,4 4 a New York case in which the plaintiff
was injured as -a result of the collapsing of a defective wheel on
his automobile. The defect could have been discovered on reasonable inspection. The Court, in affirming 'a judgment for the plaintiff, administered a beating to the doctrine of caveat emptor, and
stated that "[i] f the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably
certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it
is then a thing of 'danger."45 MacPherson thus established a duty
of care on the part of the manufacturer of any potentially dangerous product to any person who might foreseeably be expected to

4
be injured by it. 6

However, even this interpretation of the law proved to present
grave difficulties to the plaintiff who was attempting to prove his
case. Negligence was very difficult to prove, and even if the plaintiff overcame this obstacle, there was still the ever-present danger
47
that he would be found contributorily negligent.
Fairly recently, however, the area of consumer law underwent
vast changes with regard to liability for injuries caused by a dangerous defective condition of a product placed on the market.
Those who place goods on the market are now strictly liable in
tort for injuries caused by a dangerous defective condition of those
goods.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject

to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user
or consumer or to his property if
44. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).

45. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
46. 4 B. WrrmwN, SummvAn
Y Or CALIFONlA LAW 3105 (8th ed. 1974).
47. Id.

(a)
(b)
(2)
(a)
(b)

the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
it is expected to and does reach the consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
the rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
the user or consumer has not bought the product or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.48

In California, at least, the foregoing rule has been further relaxed
in that the plaintiff need now show that the product was unreasonably dangerous, but only that it was defective, 49 the prevailing
interpretation of defective being ". . . that the product does not
meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer as to
its safety. It has been said that this amounts to saying that if the
seller knew of the condition, he would be negligent in marketing
the product."5 0
Strict liability for defective products applies to the design as well
as the manufacture of a product.
... [T]here is no rational distinction between design and manufacture [in the application of strict liability for products containing
defects] since a product may be equally defective and dangerous
if its design subjects protected persons to unreasonable risk as if
its manufacture does so. 51
In order for the doctrine of strict liability to come into play, the
defective product must have been placed in the stream of commerce,
that is, the transfer to the consumer must not have been a casual
or isolated transaction.5 2 However, once the doctrine comes into
play, at least in California, its protection extends to any person
who might foreseeably be injured by the defect, and thus it may
not be restricted on a theory of privity of contract:
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
49. 4 B. WITKm, supra note 46 at 3110. The limitation that a defect
must be unreasonably dangerous burdens the injured plaintiff with proof
of an element which rings of negligence. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corporation, 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132, 501 P.2d 1153, 1161-62, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 441-42
(1972).
50. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 659-60 (4th ed. 1971).
"Unreasonably dangerous" has been interpreted as meaning that ". . . the
article must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer." 4 WITmIN, supra note 46 at 3112;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORT: § 402A, comment i at 352 (1965).
51. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Company, 2 Cal. 3d 465, 475, 467 P.2d 229,
236, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 636 (1970). See also Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corporation, 8 Cal. 3d 121, 134, 501 P.2d 1153, 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 443 (1972);
4 B. WITIN, supra note 46 at 3111.
52. Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 64, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473, 476
(1972).
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Since the doctrine applies even where the manufacturer has
attempted to limit liability, [the applicable cases] further make it
clear that the doctrine may not be limited on the theory that no
representation of safety is made to the bystander ...
The liability
has been based on the existence of a defective product which caused
injury to a human being . . . [A]n injury to a bystander is often
a perfectly forseeable risk of the maker's enterprise . . . If anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater protection than the
consumer or user where injury to bystanders is reasonably foreseeable. Consumers and users, at least, have the opportunity to
inspect for defects and to limit their purchases to articles manufactured by reputable manufacturers and sold by reputable retailers,
whereas the bystander ordinarily has no such opportunities. In
short, the bystander is in greater need of protection from defective
products which are dangerous, and if any distinction should be
made between bystanders and users, it should be made . . . to
extend greater liability in favor of the bystanders.53

A.

Liability For Defects In PersonalProperty

The doctrine of strict liability was initially applied to manufacturers.
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places
on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
defects, proves to have a defect which causes injury to a human
being. Since the liability is strict, it encompasses defects regardless
of their source, and therefore a manufacturer of a completed
product cannot escape liability by tracing the defect to a component
part supplied by another.54
It was then determined that strict liability should not be limited
to the manufacturer, but should be extended to the retailer engaged

in the business of distributing goods to the public as well:
Retailers like manufacturers are engaged in the business of distributing goods to the public. They are an integral part of the

overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the
cost of injuries resulting from defective products. [Citation omitted]. In some cases the retailer may be the only member of that
enterprise reasonably available to the injured plaintiff. In other
cases the retailer himself may play a substantial part in insuring
that the product is safe or may be in a position to exert pressure
53. Elmore v. American Motors Corporation, 70 Cal. 2d 578, 586, 451
P.2d 84, 88-89, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 656-57 (1969). Cf. W. PROSSER, supra note
50 at 663.
54. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 260-61, 391 P.2d 168,
170, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 898 (1964). See also Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 59, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 694, 700
(1963); see generally 35 CAL. JuR. 2d, Negligence § 85 (Supp. 1975).

on the manufacturer to that end; the retailer's strict liability thus
serves as an added incentive to safety. Strict liability on the manufactureer and retailer alike affords maximum protection to the
injured plaintiff and works no injustice to the defendants, for they
can adjust the costs of such protection between them in the course
of their continuing business relationship. 55
In 1969, the scope of the doctrine of strict liability was again
expanded, and strict liability was imposed upon the lessor of a
chattel for the same reasons it had been imposed on the retailer. 56
This result was approved by the Californis Supreme Court in Price
v. Shell Oil Company57 where the Court stated that there is
. . no substantial difference between sellers of personal property
and non-sellers, such as bailors and lessors. In each instance, the
seller or non-seller 'places an article on the market, knowing that
it is to be used without inspection for defects' . . . Having in mind
the market realities and the widespread use of the lease of personalty in today's business world, it makes good sense to impose on
the lessor of chattels the same liability for physical harm which
has been imposed on the manufacturers and retailers. The former
like the latter are able to bear the cost of compensating for injuries
resulting from defects by spreading the loss through an adjustment
of the rental . . . In some cases the lessor may be the only member of that enterprise reasonably available to the injured plaintiff
[citation], and the imposition of strict liability upon him serves,
as in the case of the retailer, as an incentive to safety.58
*

B.

Liability ForDefects In Real Property

As mentioned supra, the rules governing the vendor-vendee relationship in the sale of realty have undergone some change in
recent years. The veil of protection to realty transactions provided by the doctrine of caveat emptor began to erode as some
courts began applying strict liability against the builder or other
vendor of a new dwelling for defective construction causing injury
or loss to the vendee or others where:
1.

The builder or other vendor was in the business of selling
new dwellings;

55. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262-63, 391 P.2d
168, 171-72, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899-900 (1964). See also Read v. Safeway
Stores, 264 Cal. App. 2d 404, 407-08, 70 Cal. Rptr. 454, 457 (1968).
56. McClaflin v. Bayshort Equipment Rental Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 446,
79 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969).
57. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178
(1970).
58. Id. at 251-52, 466 P.2d at 726-27, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 182-83. The Court
also stated that the lessor should be in the business of leasing rather than
engaging in an isolated transaction. Id. at 254, 466 P.2d at 728, 85 Cal. Rptr.
at 184.
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2. The new dwelling was expected to and did reach the
vendee or other user of the dwelling without substantial
change in the condition in which it was sold;
3. Without regard to whether or not the builder or other
vendor exercised due care or whether or not the injured
person was in a contractual relationship with such builder
or other seller.59
California initially rejected this approach, the rule being that a
contractor's liability rests on proof of negligence because:
1. The contractor is seldom in a position to limit his liability
by disclaimer;
2. It is considerably less difficult for the occupant of a building to trace the source of a defect to the builder;
3. The occupant of a building has a much greater opportunity
to inspect a building before using it.6o
The initial rejection was itself rejected several years later. The
language used in the subsequent decisions also appeared to predict
the demise of the traditional distinctions between real and personal
property:
. . . [TJ he reasoning behind the doctrine [of strict liability] applies
to any case of injury resulting from the risk creating conduct of
a seller in any stage of the production and distribution of goods...
[I]n terms of today's society, there are no meaningful distinctions
between Eichler's mass production and sale of homes and the mass
production and sale of automobiles and . . . the pertinent overriding policy considerations are the same. Law, as an instrument
of justice, has an infinite capacity for growth to meet changing
needs and mores. . . The law should be based on current concepts of what is right and just and the judiciary should be alert
59. See Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383, 407-09 (1969).
60. Conolley v. Bull, 258 Cal. App. 2d 183, 196, 65 Cal. Rptr. 689, 696
(1968); Halliday v. Green, 244 Cal. App. 2d 482, 486-87, 53 Cal. Rptr. 267,
271 (1966). "The laws governing sales of real property, like those of regulating landlord and tenant relationships, have developed along different
lines from those laws governing sales of commercial goods ....
The
property cases which have developed the relevant governing principles for
this area of the law state no doctrine of strict liability in tort for sales of
defective real estate. In view of the fact that sales of real estate normally
take considerable time to transact, thus affording prospective purchasers
ample time to assure themselves of the condition of the property. . . we
hold that the strict liability in tort doctrine of Greenman has no application in this case." Conolley v. Bull, supra at 196-97, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 696.

' to the never ending need for keeping legal principles abreast of the
times. Ancient distinctions which make no sense in today's society
and that tend to discredit the law should be readily rejected. . .
When a vendee buys a development house from an advertised
model . . . he clearly relies on the skill of the developer and on
its implied representation that the house will be erected in a
reasonably workmanlike manner and will be reasonably fit for
habitation. He has no architect or other professional advisor of his
own, he has no real competency to inspect on his own, his actual
examination is, in the nature of things, largely superficial, and his
opportunity for obtaining meaningful protective changes in the
conveyancing documents prepared by the builder vendor is negligible. If there is improper construction such as a defective heating system or a defective ceiling, stairway and the like, the wellbeing of the vendee and others is seriously endangered and serious
injury is foreseeable. The public interest dictates if such injury
does result from the defective construction, its cost should be
borne by the responsible developer who created the danger and
who is in the better economic position to bear the loss rather than
by the injured party who justifiably relied on the developer's
skill and implied representation.
Buyers of mass produced development homes are not on an equal
footing with the builder vendors and are no more able to protect
themselves in the deed than are the automobile purchasers in a
position to protect themselves in the bill of sale.61

The result would have been startling enough if the courts had
limited the imposition of strict liability merely to structures built
upon the land. However, the imposition was not so limted, as it
was held that when a developer manufactures a
• . . lot by cutting, grading, filling and compacting for the purpose
of sale to the public and the construction of a house thereon, knowing that if said work was defective, it would cause damage to any
improvements thereon; . . . the manufacturer of a lot may be held
strictly liable in tort for damages suffered by the owner62 as a
proximate result of any defects in the manufacturing process.

Necessarily, if only for purposes of space, the foregoing discussion
,of modern products liability law has been brief. However, the
essential point to be made is that these principles have not only
been extended to govern commercial transfers of personalty, but
also to the development and sale of the land itself. Yet, while these
principles have been extended to leases of personalty, they have
not been extended to leases of real property and, most notably,
to leases involving the residential tenant, who, in reality, has far
less control over his piece of "realty" than does the purchaser of
61. Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 610-11, 77 Cal.

Rptr. 633, 636 (1969); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d
244, 227-28, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749, 752-53 (1969). See generally Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
62. Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 615, 77 Cal. Rptr.
633, 639 (1969).
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a home in a development tract. At this time, any distinctions
between the seller and lessor of personalty, and the seller and lessor
of commercial residential property are not convincing, and should
be re-examined in the light of the trend of modern products liability
law.
IV.

RECENT TRENDS IN THE LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP

The landlord-tenant relationship has been considerably changed
by recent decisions involving the rights of tenants and the quality
of their dwelling units. What should have been a significant holding with regard to the landlord's tort liability for defects upon the
premises was the decision that a lease agreement contains an implied warranty of habitability,68 that is, that a dwelling unit will
meet certain standards which make it fit for occupancy by human
beings:
The lessor of a building intended for the occupation of human
beings must, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, put
it into a condition fit for such occupation, and repair all subsequent

dilapidations thereof which render it untenantable . . .64

The cases which have dealt most effectively with this duty of
the landlord have been cases generally involving eviction of the
tenant for nonpayment of rent. However, with regard to the landlord's tort liability, it has long been held that the tenant's only
remedies for a breach of the landlord's statutory obligation to put
the premises in a condition fit for human occupancy (Civil Code
Section 1941)65 are to either expend one month's rent for repairs

(Civil Code Section 1942)66 or to vacate the premises.6 7

The

general rule that absent fraud, concealment, or covenant in the

lease, the landlord is not liable to the tenant for injuries due to
63. Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 662 (1972).
See also Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072-73 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
64. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941 (West 1954).

65. Id.

66.
67.

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942 (West Supp. 1975).
Gately v. Campbell, 124 Cal. 520, 523, 57 P. 567, 568 (1899).

Civil

Code Section 1942 provides that if the landlord fails to repair a condition
within a reasonable time after he has been given notice to repair, the
tenant may repair the condition where the cost is not greater than one

month's rent.

The remedy is available once in a twelve month period.

CAL. Cirv. CODE § 1942 (West Supp. 1975).

the defective condition or faulty construction of the demised
premises is not changed by Civil Code Section 1941.68
This appears to be an unrealistic interpretation of Civil Code
Section 1941, especially when considering other statutes, for a violation of which the landlord has been held liable in tort.
In Ewing v. Balan,69 the tenant, injured by an exploding gas
heater, sued the landlord for damages. The Court examined former
Health and Safety Code Section 1690570 (requiring gas appliances
to be kept in good repair) and determined that the statute
was designed to protect, among others, occupants of apartment
houses. 71 The Court, in upholding the plaintiff's right of action,
then held that where a penal statute establishes a standard of care,
and a violation of the statute causes the kind of injury to a member
of the protected class that the statute is designed to prevent,
72
negligence is presumed.
... [W]here legislation prescribes a standard of conduct for
purpose of protecting life, limb, or property from a certain type of
risk, and harm to the interest sought to be protected comes about
through breach of the standard from the risk sought to be obviated,
then the statutory prescription of the standard will at least be considered in determining civil rights and liabilities.
A penal statute which is imposed for the protection of particular
individuals establishes a duty of care based on contemporary
community values and ethics. The law of torts can only be out
of joint7 3with community standards if it ignores the existence of such
duties.
68. Singer v. Eastern Columbia, Inc., 72 Cal. App. 2d 402, 407, 164 P.2d
531, 533 (1945); 30 CAL. JTJR. 2d, Landlord & Tenant § 146 (1956). See also
Sieber v. Blanc, 76 Cal. 173, 174, 18 P. 260, 261 (1888). Under Civil Code
§§ 1941 and 1942, ". . . it is the duty of the landlord to repair upon notice,
and if he does not perform this duty he is to be compelled to pay, by
deduction from the rent, to the extent of a month's rental-or, at the option
of the tenant, the term be concluded without redress to the landlord." Van
Everly v. Ogg, 59 Cal. 563, 566 (1881).
69. Ewing v. Balan, 168 Cal. App. 2d 619, 336 P.2d 561 (1959).
70. See the former California State Housing Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAF.
CODE §§ 15000-17902 (Deerings 1961), repealed Stats. 1961 ch. 1844 § 7.
Now see CAL. HEALTH & SAP. CODE §§ 17910-17995 (West Supp. 1975); 25
CAL. ADM. CODE §§ 1000-1096.
71. Ewing v. Balan, 168 Cal. App. 2d 619, 621-22, 336 P.2d 561, 563
(1959).
72. Id. at 622, 336 P.2d at 564. See also Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 705 (1951)
(effect of a statute requiring the property to be kept in good repair on the
landlord's liability for injury to the tenant or his privies); Annot., 84
A.L.R.2d 1143 (1962) (landlord's liability for injury or death to the tenant
resulting from the plumbing system or equipment); Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d
1190 (1962) (same, water heater); Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 791 (1962) (same,
heating system); Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 838 (1962) (same, electrical system).
73. Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C.
Cir. 1960). The case involved a breach of housing regulation which
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It has been said that the paramount policy underlying recent
amendments to the California State Housing Law and accompanying regulations is the public health and safety.7 4 Yet, at least for
the purposes of the landlord's tort liability, this policy has not been
imputed to Civil Code Section 1941.
The non-existence of the landlord's tort liability for a violation
of the standards imposed by Civil Code Section 1941 may be due
to the fact that the statute is not considered penal. However, the
distinction is faulty in that Section 1941 establishes a standard
designed to protect the tenant from living in an uninhabitable
dwelling unit. If a violation of that standard creates a condition
of uninhabitability which thereby causes an injury, the landlord
should be similarly liable for the damage caused as he would under
what is considered 'to be a penal statute.
V.

A

PROPOSAL

75

In Fakhoury v. Magner, the plaintiff was injured by a defective couch in her rented furnished apartment. The landlord lost
during the trial, but successfully moved for a new trial, and the
tenant appealed. In reversing the order for a new trial and affirming the tenant's judgment, the Court stated that a landlord of a
furnished apartment is also a lessor of the personalty within that
apartment and, as such, he is held to the same degree of liability
for defects in those furnishings as any lessor of personalty. Thus,
"... the doctrine of strict liability does apply to the landlord
[of a furnished apartment] . . .as lessor of the furniture. 70
Perhaps it is presumptious, but possibly a tenant should be able
to expect the ceilings and walls of an apartment to be as stable
required the landlord to put the premises in a safe condition prior to their
rental. Id. at 950.
74. Baum Electric Company v. City of Huntington Beach, 33 Cal. App.
3d 573, 581-82, 109 Cal. Rptr. 260, 266 (1973). This policy is expressly
stated in the Health and Safety Code.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§

17921 and 17964 (West Supp. 1975).
75. Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972).
76. Id. at 63, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476. The landlord has traditionally been
held liable for damages caused by defects in furnishings existing at the
beginning of the term under an implied warranty theory. See Green v.
Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 626, n.11, 517 P.2d 1168, 1174, n.11, 111
Cal. Rptr. 704, 710, n.11 (1974); Forrester v. Hoover Hotel & Inv. Co., 87
Cal. App. 2d 226, 232, 196 P.2d 825, 828-29 (1948); Charleville v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 136

Ca.

App. 349, 355, 29 P.2d 241, 244 (1934).

as a furnished couch. It is submitted
held strictly liable in tort for injuries
a dangerous defective condition of the
tenant rents a dwelling unit, it is not
action as a conveyance of an interest
transaction is the leasing of a product.

that the landlord should be
or damages resulting from
demised premises. When a
realistic to view the transin land; a more analogous

In Inman v. Binghampton Housing Authority,77 the plaintiff was

injured after falling from the porch of an apartment which he
alleged was negligently designed, and suit was brought against the
landlord and the builder. In reversing the dismissal of the cause
of action against the builder, the intermediate appellate court
applied the principles of MacPhersonv. Buick75 and stated:
...[W]e can see no valid reason for a distinction between real
and personal property so far as the principle of liability is

concerned.

Indeed, the arguments for and against liability are

almost precisely the same in each instance. The trend of modern
legal scholarship appears to sustain the view that no cogent reason

exists for continuing the distinction

. .

. [W]e can see no logic

in the assertion that because one is affixed to real estate and the
other is a movable chattel that there must be a difference in
principle so far as liability to third persons is concerned...
[S]uch a distinction has become outmoded in our complex and
highly industrial society. The imminence of danger should be the
test and not the classification of the object from which the danger
emanates. 79

"The continued vitality of the common law depends upon its
77. Inman v. Binghampton Housing Authority, 1 App. Div. 2d 559,
152 N.Y.S. 2d 79 (1956).
78. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
79. Inman v. Binghampton Housing Authority, 1 App. Div. 2d 559,
563, 152 N.Y.S. 2d 79, 83 (1956). The decision in favor of the tenant in this
case was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Inman v. Binghampton Housing Authority, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957). While
the Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division's discussion
regarding the distinction between real and personal property, Id. at 144,
143 N.E.2d at 898-99, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 703-04, the Court stated that MacPherson had a bearing only on the ". . . duty of guarding against hidden
defects and giving notice of concealed dangers...
[A] duty is owed, a
liability is imposed, only if the defect or danger be not known or patent or
discoverable by a recent inspection." (emphasis is original.) Id. at 145,
143 N.E.2d at 899, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 704. The Court reversed the decision of
the Appellate Division because the plaintiff had not alleged that the defect
was latent. Id. at 145-46, 143 N.E.2d at 899-900, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 704-05.
Neither case is clear as to the disposition of the case against the landlord.
The MacPherson requirement that the defect be latent is no longer
followed in the recent strict liability cases. See Luque v. McClean, 8 Cal.
3d 136, 139, 144-45, 501 P.2d 1163, 1165, 1169-70, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 445,
449-50 (1972); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 127, 501 P.2d
1153, 1157, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 437 (1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTs § 402A, comment n (1965).
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ability to reflect contemporary community values and ethics.

80

Yet, where is that vitality when the principles governing the tort
obligations of today's landlord and tenant relationship are basically
the same as those which governed the agrarian tenant of the early
middle ages? In Green v. Superior Court,8s the Court stated that
recent decisions have recognized that the geographic and economic
conditions that characterized the agarian lessor-lessee transaction
have been entirely transformed in the modem urban landlord and
tenant relationship.

"The typical city dweller

.

.

cannot realisti-

cally be viewed as acquiring an interest in land; rather, he has contracted for a place to live. '8 2 Further, the increasing complexity
of modern apartment buildings not only renders them much more
difficult and expensive to repair than the living quarters of an
earlier day, but also makes adequate inspection of the premises by
the prospective tenant a virtual impossibility; the landlord, who
has had experience with the building, is certainly in a much better
83
position to discover and to cure dilapidations.
The idea that a new theory of tort liability may be imposed on
the landlord and tenant relationship appears compelling from the
language of the major decisions construing the warranty of habitability. 4 In their decisions, the Courts are using the major
product liability cases as support for their conclusions regarding
the warranty of habitability. It appears certain that the courts
will not limit themselves to major revision of only one aspect of
the landlord and tenant relationship, that is, that the premises be
habitable, but the concepts stated in the habitability cases will be
80. Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.
1970).

81. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 2d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704 (1974).
82. Id. at 623, 517 P.2d at 1172, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 708. The court goes
on to state that California courts have increasingly recognized the largely
contractual nature of contemporary lease agreements, and have frequently
analyzed such leases' terms pursuant to contractual principles, id. at 624,

517 P.2d at 1172, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 708, and that the application of contract
principles is particularly appropriate in dealing with residential leases of
urban dwelling units. Id. at 624, 517 P.2d at 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
83. Id. at 624, 517 P.2d at 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 711.

84. See Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E. 2d 831
(Mass. 1973), where the Court states that since no tort liability was
involved in the case, it would not consider liability for injuries arising from
conditions making an apartment uninhabitable. Id. at 843 n.14.

expanded to concern tort liability for injuries resulting from an
uninhabitable condition of the premises.
Implied warranties of quality have not been limited to cases involving sales. The consumer renting a chattel, paying for services,
or buying a combination of good and services must rely on the skill
and honesty of the supplier to at least the same extent as a purchaser of goods. Courts have not hesitated to find implied warranties of fitness and merchantibility in such situations... Now,
...courts have begun to hold sellers and developers of real property responsible for the quality of their product. For example,
builders of new homes have recently been held liable to purchasers
for improper construction on the ground that the builders had
breached an implied warranty of fitness. .

.

. Despite this trend

in the sale of real estate, many courts have been unwilling to imply
warranties of quality . . . into leases of apartments.

Recent deci-

sions have offered no convincing explanation for their refusal;
rather they have relied without discussion on the old common law
rule that the lessor is not obligated to repair unless he covenants
to do so in the written lease contracts.8 5

Yet, the refusal of the courts to re-examine their positions in this
regard completely ignores the contemporary landlord and tenant
relationship as it exists in a residential setting. As was stated by
the Court in Green:
In most significant respects, the modern urban tenant is in the same
position as any other consumer of goods. Through a residential
lease, a tenant seeks to purchase 'housing' from his landlord for
a specified period of time. The landlord 'sells' housing, enjoying
a much greater opportunity, incentive and capacity than a tenant
to inspect and maintain the condition of his apartment building. A
tenant may reasonably expect that the product he is purchasing is
fit for the purpose for which it is obtained, that is, a living unit.
Moreover, since a lease contract specifies a designated period of
time during which the tenant has a right to inhabit the premises,
the tenant may legitimately except that the premises will be fit for
such habitation for the duration of the term of the lease. It is just
such reasonable expectations of consumers which the modern
'implied warranty' decisions endow with formal legal protection.
[emphasis added]8 6
. . [T]he
[
tenant must rely upon the skill and bona fides of his
landlord at least as much as a car buyer must rely upon the car
manufacturer. In dealing with major problems, such as heating,
plumbing, electrical or structural, the tenant's position corresponds
precisely with 'the ordinary consumer who cannot be expected to
have the knowledge or capacity or even the opportunity to make

adequate inspection of mechanical instrumentalities, like automo-

biles, and to decide for himself
whether they are reasonably fit
for the designed purpose'.8 7
85. Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075-76 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
86. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 2d 616 at 627, 517 P.2d 1168 at
1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 at 711 (1974).
87. Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
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The courts have now indicated that they will see the residential
apartment as a product, as it should be seen. The residential apartment unit is made available to the consumer in much the same
way as a lessor of chattels makes his product available. The only
real difference is that the dwelling unit cannot be removed from
where it stands.
In actuality, the tenant does not contract for an interest in land.
With regard to a residential dwelling unit in a multi-unit complex,
the tenant generally has no right to use the land itself as an owner
in fee or a holder under a commercial lease might. Essentially,
what the tenant receives is a product to be used for a particular
purpose, the purpose being occupancy. The tenant's ability and
opportunity to inspect this product is no greater than his ability
and opportunity to inspect a marketable product such as an automobile. A dangerous defective condition in the tenant's product
can result in consequences as serious as a dangerous defective condition in any product, and possibly more so. At least with certain
products such as an automobile, the user has, at least a vague realization that its use can be dangerous. Yet this same user will have
no such realization regarding the normal use of his apartment, but
in all liklihood will feel safe and secure from the dangers of the
outside world while protected by its walls.
A new theory of liability for dangerous defective conditions
within the residential premises is compelling. In reality, the dwelling unit is a product, and the use of that product, including the
means of access, should be safe. To attain this end, the living facilities of the residential tenant ought to be treated as a product for
all purposes, including the imposition of strict liability in tort for
a dangerous defective condition upon the residential premises.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is submitted that the landlord should be strictly
liable in tort for injuries to his tenants and at least to others lawfully on the premises caused by dangerous defective conditions not
only within the individual dwelling units, but -also within the entire
residential apartment complex. An exception would be where a
tenant who caused a defect were himself injured by that defect.

However, even if a defect were to develop after the tenancy
commenced, if the landlord had notice of the defect but failed to
act within a reasonable time, he should still be held strictly liable
for the ensuing damages. (Admittedly, the failure to act could also
be seen as negligence).
The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one,
for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business. It is to the
public interest to discourage the marketing of products having
defects that are a menace to the public.88
By the same token, the risk of injury can be insured by the
landlord and distributed among his tenants as a cost of doing
business. It is to the public interest to discourage the leasing of
residential dwelling units having defects that are a menace to those
who use them.

MICHAEL K. McKIBBIN

88. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436,
441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). See also Fakhoury v. Magner, 25
Cal. App. 3d 58, 64, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473, 477 (1972), for the application of
this principle to the landlord of a furnished apartment.

